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STATE OF THE ART IN MONTANA PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW 
Carl Tobias· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States District Court for the District of Montana 
recently certified an important question of products liability law 
to the Montana Supreme Court. United States Senior District 
Judge Paul J. Hatfield certified the following question: 
In a strict products liability case for injuries caused by an in-
herently unsafe product, is the manufacturer conclusively pre-
sumed to know the dangers inherent in his product, or is state-
of-the-art evidence admissible to establish whether the manu-
facturer knew or through the exercise of reasonable human 
foresight should have known of the danger?1 
Because the issue of the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence 
in a products liability case is important to the jurisprudence of 
products liability law in Montana but is an unresolved question, 
the issue warrants analysis. This essay undertakes that effort. 
The piece first affords a brief overview of state of the art. 
The essay next examines the origins and development of prod-
ucts liability law in Montana and whether the Montana Supreme 
Court or the Montana Legislature has expressly addressed the 
issue of state of the art. Finding that the court has spoken with 
greater specificity than the legislature but that neither entity 
has treated the question with much particularity, the paper then 
evaluates additional sources of law which the Montana Supreme 
Court might consult in resolving this issue. The essay concludes 
with suggestions for how the court should resolve the question of 
the admissibility of state of the art in Montana. 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Chris Fiann and 
Hank Waters for valuable research, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for 
processing this piece, as well as Ann and Tom Boone and the Harris Trust for gen-
erous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See Sternhagen v. Dow Co., No. CV-88-158 GF (D. Mont. filed Apr. 1, 1996) 
(Order of Certification) [hereinafter Order]. Judge Hatfield's certification order includ-
ed a five-page discussion of his "opinion that the state-of-the-art defense is entirely 
inconsistent with the doctrine of strict liability in tort as developed in the State of 
Montana." Id. at 3. 
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II. A WORD ABOUT STATE OF THE ART 
An important question at the outset is what is the question. 
American jurisdictions treat state of the art in numerous differ-
ent ways. 2 State courts variously define "state of the art." Most 
jurisdictions consider it to be the knowledge reasonably avail-
able, or the safest existing technology adapted for use, at the 
time of the product's manufacture,3 while numerous states de-
fine state of the art as industry knowledge, custom or practice.4 
Some states also seem to find important the specific type of de-
fect at issue, treating rather differently design defects and inade-
quate warnings. Moreover, a few jurisdictions apparently consid-
er significant the particular product alleged to be defective. For 
example, states may distinguish necessities from luxuries or 
health care products from asbestos. Nonetheless, the national 
jurisprudence remains so fractured that clear patterns involving 
product types are very difficult to identify. 
Most jurisdictions impose on manufacturers a "duty to warn 
only of risks that were known or should have been known to a 
reasonable person,"5 thereby making state of the art admissible 
in products liability cases alleging failure to warn. However, 
some states charge manufacturers with that knowledge which is 
available at the time of trial, regardless of whether defendants 
"knew or reasonably could have known of the risk,"6 thus consid-
ering state of the art inadmissible. 
Many of those jurisdictions which recognize state of the art 
treat it as an affirmative defense and permit manufacturers to 
show that they did not know and could not have discovered that 
their products were defective in light of existing scientific or 
2. I rely in this section on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft]. With the 
exception of Montana, I emphasize in this essay case law-common law, not 
statutory, development of the state of the art idea. Statutory articulation of the con-
cept in other states should have limited relevance to the Montana Supreme Court's 
resolution of the question certified as a matter of common law. · 
3. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 
(Cal. 1991); Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1175 (Colo. 1993). See gener-
ally Tentative Draft, supra note 2, at 88. 
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Minster Machine, 699 F.2d 628, 633 (10th Cir. 1981); 
Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So. 2d 447, 450 (Ala. 1991). See generally Ten-
tative Draft, supra note 2, at 88. 
5. Tentative Draft, supra note 2, at 120. Anderson, 810 P.2d at 549, is illus-
trative. 
6. See Tentative Draft, supra note 2, at 122. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos 
Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (D. Haw. 1988), affd sub nom. In re Hawaii Federal 
Asbestos Cases v. Raymark Ind., 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992), is illustrative. 
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technological knowledge. New Jersey is the leading state which 
considers state of the art as an aspect of plaintiffs affirmative 
cause of action, making state of the art relevant to, but not dis-
positive of, the risk-utility balancing test of whether a product is 
defective. 7 
Insofar as possible, I attempt to analyze the particular prod-
uct at issue, 2,4-D, and to assess the defect alleged, failure to 
warn, in the Sternhagen case. I also attempt to answer the ques-
tions posed as Judge Hatfield certified them.8 Moreover, I rely 
on certain aspects of the judge's discussion that in his opinion 
the "state-of-the-art defense is entirely inconsistent with the 
doctrine of strict liability in tort as developed in the State of 
Montana.m1 
Ill. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF MONTANA PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW 
A. The Montana Case Law Jurisprudence 
The origins and development of Montana products liability 
case law warrant considerable treatment here because that prod-
ucts liability jurisprudence will facilitate resolution of the issue 
of the admissibility of state of the art. This is true, even though 
Montana products jurisprudence does not address state of the art 
very specifically, and the history of Montana products liability 
law has been rather comprehensively assessed elsewhere. 10 
The Montana Supreme Court first recognized strict liability 
in tort under Section 402A of the Restatement Second of Torts in 
the landmark 1973 case of Brandenburger u. Toyota Motor 
Sales. 11 The court expressly enumerated a list of public policy 
rationales on which it relied to justify the adoption of strict lia-
7. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983); see also Sturm, 
Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44-45 (Alaska 1979). 
8. In theory, the Montana Supreme Court apparently has the discretion to 
reformulate questions that the Montana Federal District Court certifies. See MONT. 
R. APP. P. 44. However, in practice, the Montana Supreme Court has apparently not 
reformulated questions but rather has refused to accept questions that the Montana 
Federal District attempted to certify which the Montana Supreme Court might have 
reformulated. Interview with Professor William F. Crowley, University of Montana 
School of Law, in Missoula, MT. (June 14, 1996). 
9. See Order, supra note 1, at 3. 
10. See, e.g., William 0. Bronson, Developments in Montana Products Liability 
Law, 1977-1987, 48 MONT. L. REV. 297 (1987); Carl W. Tobias & William A 
Rossbach, A Framework For Analysis of Products Liability in Montana, 38 MONT. L. 
REv. 221 (1977). 
11. 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973). 
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bility under Section 402A in Brandenburger. 12 These included 
the defendant's superior ability to prevent defects and to pay for 
the injuries that defects cause, particularly in contrast with 
consumers whom defective products harm. 13 The public policies 
have been especially important to the development of Montana 
products liability jurisprudence because the Montana Supreme 
Court has adverted to the policies when resolving untreated 
specific issues of products liability law in subsequent cases. 14 
The Montana Supreme Court has issued numerous products 
liability opinions in the twenty-three years since it decided 
Brandenburger; however, the court has not addressed the ques-
tion of state of the art's admissibility with much specificity dur-
ing that period. Rix v. General Motors Corporation 15 is the case 
which is most relevant to state of the art, but even that opinion 
addresses the issue rather obliquely. 
In Rix, plaintiff alleged that the defendant's single brake 
system which was offered as a standard feature was defectively 
designed because the defendant had the "knowledge, capacity, 
and capability to incorporate a split (dual) brake system, and in 
fact did so as optional equipment if ordered by [the] purchas-
ers."16 The plaintiff also claimed that the "accident would have 
been less severe or would not have happened had the truck been 
equipped with a dual system. "17 
The Montana Supreme Court purported to "render an opin-
ion only with regard" to whether the "single brake system [was] 
defective and unreasonably dangerous in view of the fact that a 
dual brake system was technologically feasible at the time of 
manufacture and was offered" for sale by the defendant. 18 The 
12. The court reproduced from an Arizona case eight policy "reasons for the ap-
plication of the doctrine of strict liability." Brandenburger, 162 Mont. at 514-15, 513 
P.2d at 273 (citing Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 467 P.2d 256, 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1970) (Jacobson, J., concurring)). 
13. See id. These rationales also included the public interest in discouraging the 
marketing of defective products and in placing responsibility on manufacturers that 
are responsible for products reaching the market and the difficulty that plaintiffs 
have in proving that products were negligently manufactured. See id. 
14. See, e.g., Mc.Junkin v. Kaufman & Broad Home Systems, 229 Mont. 432, 
442-45, 748 P.2d 910, 916-18 (1987); Streich v. Hilton-Davis, 214 Mont. 44, 51-52, 
692 P.2d 440, 444 (1984); Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 109-11, 576 
P.2d 711, 718-19 (1978). 
15. 222 Mont. 318, 723 P.2d 195 (1986). 
16. Rix, 222 Mont. at 322-23, 723 P.2d at 198. 
17. Id. at 323, 723 P.2d at 198. 
18. Id. at 327, 723 P.2d at 201. "We do not rule upon the fact situation where 
a claim of design defect is made and where no alternative design is technologically 
feasible." Id. The court cited O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983), 
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court refused to "define design defect by the terminology of un-
reasonably dangerous design or defective design"19 but suggest-
ed that "balancing of various factors is required by a jury. "20 
The Montana Supreme Court provided "certain elements 
[that] should be considered for instructional purposes in an alter-
native design products liability case" by judges and juries. 21 The 
court specified five factors: the reasonable probability that the 
product as originally designed would seriously harm the plaintiff; 
a comparison of this probability with the risk posed by the alter-
native design; comparison of the relative costs both to the manu-
facturer and consumer of the two designs; the technological feasi-
bility of the alternative design; and the time reasonably required 
to implement this design.22 However, the court admonished that 
"not all factors may be appropriate in every case," that "addition-
al factors should be considered" when proper, and that district 
judges should supplement the factors in light of the proof sub-
mitted during trials. 23 
The Montana Supreme Court did observe in Rix that a "de-
sign is defective if at the time of manufacture an alternative 
designed product would have been safer than the original de-
signed product and was both technologically feasible and a mar-
ketable reality."24 However, the court made this statement in 
the context of deciding whether evidence of a manufacturer's 
subsequent remedial measures was admissible under Rule 407 of 
the Montana Rules of Evidence.25 Moreover, the court specifical-
ly observed that it was restating the opinion's earlier analysis of 
the narrow issue of design defect in an alternative design case in 
which the defendant actually produced a technologically feasible 
which suggests that a plaintiff could prevail in that situation, particularly when the 
product has limited utility. 
19. Rix, 222 Mont. at 327, 723 P.2d at 201. "[W)e do not find these tests to be 
helpful and choose not to adopt them." Id. 
20. Id. at 328, 723 P.2d at 201. The court was apparently subscribing to the 
risk-utility balancing test which most jurisdictions apply. See Tentative Draft, supra 
note 2, at 50-51. Dean John Wade developed a list of seven factors on which many 
courts rely when applying risk-utility balancing in duty-to-warn cases. See John W. 
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38 
(1973). Case examples are O'Brien, 463 A2d at 304-05; Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 
125, 128-29 (Or. 1974). 
21. "A jury should be instructed to weigh various factors according to the facts 
of each case and their own judgment." Rix, 222 Mont. at 328, 723 P.2d at 201. 
22. See Rix, 222 Mont. at 328, 723 P.2d 201-02. 
23. Id. 
24. Rix, 222 Mont. at 330, 723 P.2d at 202. 
25. See Rix, 222 Mont. at 330, 723 P.2d at 202-03; see also MONT. R. Evm. 
407. 
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alternative design at the time of manufacture.26 In Krueger v. 
General Motors Corporation,27 the Montana Supreme Court reit-
erated the proposition from Rix included in this paragraph's first 
sentence when resolving an issue relating to the admissibility of 
evidence that resembled the evidentiary question which the court 
had treated in Rix.28 · 
Several difficulties attend efforts to rely on the pronounce-
ments in Rix when deciphering the state-of-the-art idea in Mon-
tana. First, the Montana Supreme Court never specifically men-
tioned the concept. Second, the court was addressing a narrowly 
circumscribed and relatively straightforward factual situation in 
which defendant actually manufactured a technologically feasible 
alternative at the time of sale. Third, the Montana Supreme 
Court afforded rather generalized guidance that may have some-
what limited applicability. 
The Rix decision includes the pronouncements of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court which seem most applicable to state of the 
art. Additional particular opinions and the general tenor of the 
Montana case law jurisprudence do address state of the art less 
specifically. Perhaps most important are the Montana Supreme 
Court's longstanding insistence that the basis of products liabili-
ty for defective products under Section 402A and Brandenburger 
in Montana is strict liability in tort, not negligence, and the 
court's continuing invocation of, and adherence to, the public 
policies which underlie strict liability in tort, particularly as 
articulated in Brandenburger.29 
Numerous aspects of the Montana Supreme Court's products 
26. See Rix, 222 Mont. at 328, 723 P.2d at 202; see also supra notes 16-23 and 
accompanying text. 
27. 240 Mont. 266, 783 P.2d 1340 (1989). 
28. Id. at 274, 783 P.2d at 1345. The court in Krueger, 240 Mont. at 273, 783 
P.2d at 1345, and Rix, 222 Mont. at 326, 723 P.2d at 200, invoked an earlier case 
for the idea that "design is judged not by the condition of the product, but the state 
of scientific and technological knowledge available to the designer at the time the 
product was placed on the market." See Kuiper v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 207 
Mont. 37, 62, 673 P.2d 1208, 1221 (1983). The issue-the proof that a plaintiff must 
make in a design defect case-to which the Kuiper court applied the idea of the 
state of scientific and technological knowledge available at the time of marketing is 
more removed from state of the art than the issue of subsequent remedial measures. 
Tacke v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 220 Mont. 1, 5, 713 P.2d 527, 530 (1986), also specifical-
ly mentions state of the art when alluding to plaintiffs proof: "Plaintiff presented 
expert testimony to demonstrate that . . . the design was unnecessary in the first 
place because Vermeer and others had successfully designed and sold balers without 
compression rollers and the state of the art would have allowed it in 1975 when the 
baler was purchased." 
29. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
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jurisprudence illustrate the court's ongoing belief that products 
liability sounds in strict liability, rather than negligence. For 
example, the Montana Supreme Court has twice held that strict 
liability in tort applies to consumer disappointment with prod-
ucts that cause no personal injury,30 although the overwhelming 
majority of states relegate plaintiffs to commercial law remedies 
in this situation.31 The court has correspondingly scrutinized 
the trial by district courts of several products cases to insure 
that the trial judges did not improperly inject negligence con-
cepts into strict liability cases. 32 Illustrative of the Montana 
Supreme Court's continuing reliance on policies which support 
strict liability in tort, especially as enunciated in Brandenburger, 
has been the court's rejection of defendants' assertion that 
defects' "open and obvious" nature should be a defense because 
the court found that this approach would encourage misdesign, 
thereby directly contravening an important strict liability poli-
cy.33 
I could offer other particular cases that address, and addi-
tional examples of ways that the general tenor of the Montana 
products jurisprudence speaks to, state of the art less specifically 
than Rix. However, the ideas reviewed immediately above are 
probably most relevant. Those concepts also strongly support 
Judge Hatfield's "opinion that the state-of-the-art defense is 
entirely inconsistent with the doctrine of strict liability in tort as 
developed in the State of Montana. "34 
30. See Mc.Junkin v. Kaufman & Broad Home Systems, 229 Mont. 432, 748 
P.2d 910 (1987); Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes, 198 Mont. 461, 647 P.2d 334 
(1982); see also Streich v. Hilton-Davis, 214 Mont. 44, 692 P.2d 440 (1984). 
31. See, e.g., Danforth v. Acorn Structures, 608 A2d 1194 (Del. 1992); Chemtrol 
Adhesives v. American Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co., 537 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio 1989); see also 
East River S.S. Co. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). See generally Ten-
tative Draft, supra note 2, at 175-94. 
32. See, e.g., Krueger v. General Motors Corp., 240 Mont. 266, 275-77, 783 P.2d 
1340, 1346-47 (1989); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger, 203 Mont. 90, 93-94, 661 P.2d 17, 18-
19 (1983); see also Lutz v. National Crane Corp., 267 Mont. 368, 377-82, 884 P.2d 
455, 460-63 (1994); Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711 
(1977); Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods, 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1977). The court 
has also scrutinized and reversed district court grants of summary judgment to de-
fendants in products cases. See Emery v. Federated Foods, 262 Mont. 83, 863 P.2d 
426 (1993); Hagen v. Dow Chem. Co., 261 Mont. 487, 863 P.2d 413 (1993). 
33. See Brown, 176 Mont. at 106-10, 576 P.2d at 717-19; Stenberg, 123 Mont. 
at 132, 576 P.2d at 730-31; see also Tacke, 220 Mont. at 12-13, 713 P.2d at 534-35. 
34. See Order, supra note 1, at 3. 
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B. Montana Legislative Developments 
The Montana Legislature has addressed state of the art with 
even less specificity than the Montana Supreme Court. The legis-
lature passed a products liability statute in 1987. However, that 
measure essentially codified the Restatement Second of Torts 
articulation of the affirmative cause of action, the core language 
of which requires that a product be in a "defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous. "35 · 
The legislation also prescribed two applicable affirmative 
defenses neither of which could fairly be characterized as having 
much relationship to the idea of state of the art.36 The first de-
fense applies when the product's user or consumer "discovered 
the defect or the defect was open and obvious and the user or 
consumer unreasonably made use of the product and was injured 
by it."37 The second defense applies if the user or consumer un-
reasonably misused the product and "such misuse caused or 
contributed to the injury."38 
When the Montana Supreme Court considers these statutory 
defenses, it should remember an especially relevant observation 
which Judge Hatfield included in his discussion. The judge stat-
ed: "It is imperative to note that as of 1987, the debate whether 
to allow evidence of the state-of-the-art in the context of a strict 
liability claim, it is fair to say, was raging, and the Legislature 
was well aware of the State of Montana's decisional law regard-
ing strict liability claims founded upon a manufacturer's failure 
to warn. "39 
In sum, neither the Montana Supreme Court nor the Mon-
tana Legislature has addressed state of the art with much par-
ticularity. It may be appropriate, accordingly, to consult addi-
tional sources of law. These include the treatment of state of the 
35. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(2)-(3) (1995); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
36. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a)(1995). 
37. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-l-719(5)(a) (1995). 
38. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(b) (1995). The two affirmative defenses 
"mitigate or bar recovery and must be applied in accordance with the principles of 
comparative negligence set forth in 27-1-702." MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(b) (1995). 
39. Order, supra note 1, at 7. Judge Hatfield is clearly correct that many state 
legislatures had debated the state of the art issue by 1987. It is also arguable that 
the Montana Legislature's specific provision for two defenses evinced legislative intent 
to prescribe all available defenses and, thus, intent to not make state of the art an 
available defense. However, this interpretation of legislative intent ascribes compre-
hensiveness and clairvoyance, especially to legislative inaction, which may be unre-
alistic. 
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art, principally by appellate courts rather than legislative bodies, 
in other jurisdictions and in the proposed Restatement Third 
which the American Law Institute (ALI) is currently drafting. 
IV. EXTRA-MONTANA SOURCES 
A. The Value of Additional Sources 
The Montana Supreme Court has articulated a rather fully-
developed products liability jurisprudence over the nearly quar-
ter-century since it first recognized strict liability in tort in 
Brandenburger. The court, therefore, should accord greater 
weight to its pronouncements than to other states' products lia-
bility law and to the formulation in the proposed Restatement 
Third. This is especially true because many jurisdictions' juris-
prudence constitutes a complex blend of public policies that are 
most applicable within specific states and reflects complicated 
interaction between supreme courts which have articulated the 
common law and legislatures which have passed products liabili-
ty statutes. Judicial pronouncements in other jurisdictions corre-
spondingly deserve more weight than legislative developments 
because the Montana Supreme Court is resolving the questions 
certified in Sternhagen principally as a matter of common law. 
Insofar as it is possible to identify a national jurisprudence 
of state of the art, that jurisprudence is relatively fragmented in 
terms, for example, of the phrase's meaning, the concept's admis-
sibility, and state of the art's application to different types of de-
fects and products. Moreover, the Restatement Third has not 
become final and remains quite controversial, while many states 
could reject the formulation that the American Law Institute 
ultimately adopts.40 All of the above ideas suggest that the 
Montana Supreme Court should accord considerably more weight 
to its own mature jurisprudence than to these other sources of 
authority. 
40. See, e.g., David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict"' Prod-
ucts Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743, 746, 786-87; A Symposium on the 
ALI's Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 
1043-1454 (1994); Symposium The Revision of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec-
tion 402A, 10 TOURO L. REV. 1-237 (1993); ALI Approves Product Liability Draft, 
Takes First Step on New Family Law Project, 63 U.S.L.W. 2734 (1995) [hereinafter 
ALI Approves]. 
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B. Other States 
A significant majority of jurisdictions in the United States 
require manufacturers to warn only of risks of which they knew 
or should reasonably have known, thus considering state of the 
art to be admissible in products liability cases alleging failure to 
warn.41 Most of these states treat state of the art as an affirma-
tive defense and impose on defendants the burden of showing 
that they did not know and could not have discovered that their 
products were defective in light of existing scientific or technolog-
ical knowledge.42 The jurisdictions seem to premise treatment of 
state of the art primarily on principles of fairness, believing that 
it is inequitable to require a defendant to warn of a condition of 
which defendant was unaware and that so doing would essential-
ly impose "absolute liability."43 This view also seems to partake 
more of negligence than strict liability. 44 
Some states charge manufacturers with the knowledge that 
is available at the time of trial "without regard to whether the 
defendant knew or reasonably could have known of the risk."45 
These jurisdictions treat state of the art as inadmissible in prod-
ucts cases alleging failure to warn.46 The states appear to rely 
substantially on the policy arguments which underlie Section 
402A, principally that strict liability law is intended to protect 
consumers who are injured by defective products and who have 
less ability than manufacturers to guard against defects and to 
bear the costs of injuries which defects cause. 47 
41. The reporters for the Restatement Third claim that "an overwhelming ma-
jority of jurisdictions support the proposition that a manufacturer has a duty to warn 
only of risks that were known or should have been known to a reasonable person." 
Tentative Draft, supra note 2, at 120. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 
810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal. 1991), is illustrative; however, it is the only case cited from 
a leading jurisdiction. Moreover, the reporters cite only a few more cases that stand 
for the majority proposition than stand for the minority view, see infra note 45 and 
accompanying text, even though the reporters attribute the former view to "an over-
whelming majority of jurisdictions." See Tentative Draft, supra note 2, at 120-22 
(citing case law). 
42. See, e.g., Anderson, 810 P.2d at 553-60; Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 
P.2d 1168, 1175 (Colo. 1993). 
43. See, e.g., Anderson, 810 P.2d at 553-50; Fenton, 845 P.2d at 1172-75. 
44. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 
1986), affd, 758 P.2d 206 (Kan. 1988); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A2d 633, 
640 (Md. 1992). 
45. Tentative Draft, supra note 2, at 122. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 
699 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (D. Haw. 1988), affd sub nom. In re Hawaii Federal Asbes-
tos Cases v. Raymark Ind., 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992), is illustrative. 
46. See, e.g., In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. at 235-36; 
Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 P.2d 1337, 1346 (Wash. 1992). 
47. See, e.g., Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277-78 (Mass. 1984); 
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A few states consider state of the art to be admissible in 
products liability warning cases as an aspect of plaintiff's affir-
mative cause of action. The New Jersey Supreme Court has been 
the foremost proponent of this view. The court has treated state 
of the art as relevant to, but not dispositive of, the risk-utility 
balance test of whether a product is defective, while the court 
has imposed on plaintiff the ultimate burden of proving defect 
but placed the burden on the "defendant to prove that compli-
ance with state-of-the-art, in conjunction with other relevant evi-
dence, justifie[d] placing a product on the market."48 
C. The Restatement Third of Torts 
The proposed Restatement Third warrants relatively limited 
treatment here because the ALI has not finalized its work, the 
draft which the Institute will probably adopt will be controver-
sial, and I have mentioned above the proposed Restatement and 
the ALI effort. 49 The core language that governs warnings 
which the reporters included in section two of the proposal and 
which the ALI has adopted in principle essentially embodies the 
state of the art idea.50 Section 2(c) specifically provides that a 
"product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warn-
ings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product 
could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reason-
able instructions or warnings [and their omission] renders the 
product not reasonably safe. "51 This phrasing by definition re-
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods., 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (N.J. 1982). 
48. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983). As to design 
defects, the reporters find that a "few states take the position that conformance with 
the best available technology in actual use is an absolute defense to design liability 
[or] that evidence that a risk was beyond the scope of scientific knowability at the 
time of manufacture is inadmissible.n Tentative Draft, supra note 2, at 89. Woodill v. 
Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ill. 1980), is illustrative of states that treat 
state of the art as an absolute defense. Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 740 P.2d 
548, 549 (Haw. 1987), is illustrative of states that treat state of the art as inadmis-
sible. However, most jurisdictions make state of the art relevant to plaintiffs proof of 
an affirmative cause of action or to defendant's proof of an affirmative defense. See, 
e.g., O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 305 (making relevant to plaintitrs prooO; Anderson v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal. 1991) (making relevant to 
defendant's prooO. See generally Tentative Draft, supra note 2, at 89. 
49. See, e.g., supra note 40 and accompanying text (suggesting ALI work contro-
versial and not final); supra notes 2-6, 31, 40-41, 48 (mentioning proposed Re-
statement or ALI effort). 
50. See Tentative Draft, supra note 2, § 2(c); see also ALI Approves, supra note 
40 (suggesting ALI adopted in principle). 
51. Tentative Draft, supra note 2, § 2(c). 
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lieves manufacturers of liability for failing to warn of unforesee-
able risks. 
There are several reasons why the proposed Restatement 
Third's treatment of state of the art is controversial. First, this 
approach favors the interests of product manufacturers over 
product consumers. Second, the resolution effectively institutes a 
negligence, rather than a strict liability, regime for products 
liability in the context of failure to warn of allegedly unknown 
risks at the time of manufacture. Third, the treatment underem-
phasizes important public policies, such as consumer protection 
and compensation, which underlie the imposition of strict liabili-
ty in tort for defective products. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The Montana Supreme Court should treat state of the art 
evidence as inadmissible in failure to warn cases, if the court 
wants to resolve the state of the art issue in a manner that is 
most compatible with the products liability jurisprudence which 
it has developed to date. This approach would best implement 
the idea that products liability sounds in strict liability, not 
negligence, which the Montana Supreme Court has clearly artic-
ulated and steadfastly applied in many specific products liability 
cases since first recognizing strict liability in Brandenburger. 52 
The resolution would also effectuate the public policy rationales 
including, for example, consumer protection and compensation, 
that support strict liability and that the court has consistently 
honored and enforced in numerous cases over the last twenty-
three years.53 Moreover, the perspective's adoption would be 
responsive to related and additional public policies-such as 
encouraging increased manufacturer safety research, risk 
spreading, avoiding accidents, and minimizing the potential for 
confusion in the fact-finding process-on which a number of 
jurisdictions have relied when holding state of the art inadmissi-
ble. 54 
Should the Montana Supreme Court believe that making 
state of the art evidence inadmissible imposes too strict liability 
or reject this view on other grounds, the court might want to 
52. See supra notes 11-14, 29-32 and accompanying text. 
53. See supra notes 11-14, 33 and accompanying text. 
54. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods., 447 A.2d 539, 547-49 (N.J. 1982), affords 
the most thorough rendition of these public policies; see also In re Hawaii Federal 
Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233, 235-38 (D. Haw. 1988), affd sub nom. In re Ha-
waii Federal Asbestos Cases v. Raymark Ind., 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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address state of the art by harmonizing its prior products liabili-
ty jurisprudence with additional states' treatment of the concept. 
The court could do so by rejecting state of the art as a defense 
and by considering state of the art as part of the plaintiff's affir-
mative case while making state of the art relevant to, but not 
dispositive of, the risk-utility balancing test in ascertaining 
whether the defendant placed a defective product in the stream 
of trade.55 The Montana Supreme Court should impose on the 
plaintiff the ultimate burden of proving that a product is defec-
tive. However, the court ought to place on the defendant the 
burden of proving that compliance with state of the art, together 
with other relevant evidence, such as the product's utility, justi-
fied marketing the product. State of the art should be defined as 
the scientific or technological knowledge which was reasonably 
available at the time of manufacture. Because the resolution 
recommended is rather general, I attempt to afford more specific 
guidance by consulting helpful, applicable case law, namely the 
Montana Supreme Court's decision in Rix and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's opinion in O'Brien.56 
The Rix court-when prescribing a risk-utility analysis in a 
vehicular alternative design case, a factual situation that sharply 
contrasts with the inadequate warnings regarding the risks of 
2,4-D which are at issue in Sternhagen-suggested that trial 
judges instruct juries to "weigh various factors according to the 
facts of each case and their own judgment."57 The court then 
provided elements which trial judges ought to consider for "in-
structional purposes in an alternative design products liability 
case," while it recognized that all of the factors might not apply 
in every circumstance, that others should be considered when 
appropriate and that trial courts ought to augment the factors 
afforded based upon the proof submitted during trials.58 
55. I rely substantially in the remainder of this paragraph on Rix v. General 
Motors Corp., 222 Mont. 318, 327-28, 723 P.2d 195, 200-202 (1986), and on O'Brien 
v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304-06 (N.J. 1983). 
56. See Rix, 222 Mont. at 318, 723 P.2d at 195; O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 298. It 
bears emphasizing that the Rix court only purported to address the narrow issue of 
alternative design in a vehicular design defect case and that O'Brien principally in-
volved a design defect in an above-ground swimming pool. Moreover, few states sub-
scribe to the O'Brien position, while the New Jersey jurisprudence is complex and 
unclear. Compare Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) with 
Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 
2A:58C-3 to C-4 (West 1987). Nevertheless, it is possible to extrapolate from the 
helpful guidance in Rix and O'Brien to the state of the art question in the warning 
context. See also supra notes 15-26, 48 and accompanying text. 
57. Rix, 222 Mont. at 328, 723 P.2d at 201. 
58. Id. at 328, 723 P.2d at 201-02; see also supra note 22 and accompanying 
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The O'Brien court-when prescribing a risk-utility analysis 
in a case principally implicating design defects in an above-
ground swimming pool, a factual scenario that also markedly 
differs from Sternhagen-enumerated seven elements which it 
characterized as "some factors relevant in risk-utility analy-
sis."59 The New Jersey Supreme Court then examined the appli-
cability of state of the art in the context of risk-utility balancing. 
It observed that "state-of-the-art relates to both components of 
the risk-utility equation.''6° 
The court stated that the "risk side of the equation may 
involve, among other factors, risks that the manufacturer knew 
or should have known would be posed by the product as well as 
the adequacy of any warnings."61 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court found that the equation's "utility side generally will in-
clude an appraisal of the need for the product and available 
design alternatives. "62 Assessment of a product's utility also im-
plicates the relative need for it; "some products are essentials, 
while others are luxuries. "63 The court explained that a product 
which fulfills a crucial need and is susceptible to only one design 
should be treated differently than a luxury item. 64 
text (examining five factors Rix afforded). 
59. O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 304. The seven elements were: 
( 1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user 
and to the public as a whole. 
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause inju-
ry, and the probable seriousness of the injury. 
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same 
need and not be as unsafe. 
( 4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the prod-
uct without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain 
its utility. 
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of 
the product. 
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product 
and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious 
condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instruc-
tions. 
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by 
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. 
Id. at 304-05; see also supra notes 20-23 (affording additional analysis of factors, 
especially those that Dean Wade developed and courts apply). 
60. O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 305. 
61. Id. 
62. The court stated that the "assessment of the utility of a design involves the 
consideration of available alternatives. If no alternatives are available, recourse to a 
unique design is more defensible. The existence of a safer and equally efficacious de-
sign, however, diminishes the justification for using a challenged design." Id. 
63. Id. at 306. 
64. Id. The court stated: 
1996] STATE OF THE ART IN MONTANA 507 
The New Jersey Supreme Court then afforded illustrative 
guidance "in a design-defect case [involving] above-ground swim-
ming pools"65 which resembled somewhat the Rix court's guid-
ance "for instructional purposes in an alternative design prod-
ucts liability case. "66 The O'Brien court stated that a plaintiff 
seeking to make out a prima facie case should "adduce sufficient 
evidence on the risk-utility factors to establish a defect.1767 As to 
the product at issue, for instance, the court suggested that plain-
tiff might attempt to show that: 
pools are marketed primarily for recreational, not therapeutic 
purposes; that because of their design, including their configu-
ration, inadequate warnings, and the use of vinyl liners, injury 
is likely; that, without impairing the usefulness of the pool or 
pricing it out of the market, warnings against diving could be 
made more prominent and a liner less dangerous.68 
The New Jersey Supreme Court added that plaintiff may not 
have to "introduce evid<..:nce on all of those alternatives" and 
might want to offer proof regarding other considerations which 
are relevant to risk-utility balancing.69 
Because Rix and O'Brien afford comparatively general guid-
ance relating more specifically to risk-utility balancing in factual 
contexts which differ substantially from that in Sternhagen, I 
shall attempt to extrapolate from those two cases and the design 
defect scenarios which they presented to inadequate warnings. 
State of the art should not afford a defense but ought to be con-
sidered part of plaintiff's affirmative cause of action. The plain-
tiff should assume the ultimate burden of proving that a product 
is defective because it lacked adequate warnings in light of the 
relevant risk-utility factors. The defendant ought to have the 
Still other products, including some for which no alternative exists, are so 
dangerous and of such little use that under the risk-utility analysis, a man-
ufacturer would bear the cost of liability of harm to others. That cost might 
dissuade a manufacturer from placing the product on the market, even if 
the product has been made as safely as possible. 
O'Brien, 463 A2d at 306. 
65. See id. 
66. Rix v. General Motors Corp., 222 Mont. 318, 328, 723 P.2d 195, 201 (1986); 
see also supra notes 15-28, 56-57 and accompanying text (evaluating Ri:c's guidance). 
It bears reiterating that the defects alleged and the products involved in Ri:c and 
O'Brien differ significantly from those in Stenberg. 
67. O'Brien, 463 A2d at 306. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. The court also provided guidance regarding resolution of motions to 
dismiss. See id. 
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burden of proving that compliance with state of the art, in con-
junction with additional applicable evidence relating to risk and 
utility, supported the product's marketing. 
The plaintiff might make numerous more specific showings 
to satisfy the risk-utility factors. For example, plaintiff could 
adduce evidence regarding the "user's ability to avoid danger by 
the exercise of care in the use of the product [as well as] the 
user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the prod-
uct and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of 
the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suit-
able warnings or instructions. "70 The plaintiff might also at-
tempt to show that the manufacturer could have inexpensively 
afforded warnings that would not have impugned the product's 
integrity.71 
The defendant may offer a number of more particular show-
ings in light of the risk-utility factors. The defendant could intro-
duce evidence that lack of reasonably available scientific or tech-
nological knowledge respecting the harmful properties of 2,4-D at 
the time of manufacture complicated the defendant's efforts to 
provide specific warnings. 72 The defendant might claim that this 
lack of knowledge similarly prevented it from appreciating that 
the product could cause injury or the seriousness of that harm, 
much less institute precautions to minimize relevant risks. 73 
Both the plaintiff and the defendant may wish to make sev-
eral more specific showings relating to the risk-utility factors. 
For instance, each party would want to adduce evidence regard-
ing the "usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to 
the user and to the public as a whole. "74 This idea directly im-
plicates the concomitant notion of the "availability of a substitute 
product which would meet the same need and not be as un-
safe."75 In the final analysis, the jury may be weighing the hen-
70. These are the fifth and sixth factors in O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 304; see also 
supra note 59. 
71. These implicate the fourth factor in O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 304; see also su-
pra note 59, and subfactors (c) and (d) of the third factor in Rix, 222 Mont. at 328, 
723 P.2d at 201-02; see also supra text accompanying note 22. Plaintiff may also 
want to show that additional testing or inquiry by the manufacturer might have 
cured or ameliorated the lack of knowledge of a product's dangerous propensities. 
72. This implicates the factors listed in note 71, supra. 
73. These implicate the second factor in O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 304; see also su-
pra note 59, and subfactors (a) and (b) of the third factor in Rix, 222 Mont. at 318, 
723 P.2d at 201; see also supra text accompanying note 22. 
74. This is the first factor in O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 304; see also supra note 59. 
In other words, how important was 2,4-D to the individuals involved, to agriculture 
and to society? 
75. This is the third factor in O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 204; see also supra note 59, 
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efits of 2,4-D's application against the risk of harm to which the 
product's use exposed plaintiff and the injury that plaintiff ulti-
mately suffered. 
It is difficult to afford much more specific guidance, particu-
larly regarding the product and the defect at issue in 
Sternhagen; however, a few ideas can be offered. The judge 
should charge the jury to apply the risk and utility factors to the 
evidence which the plaintiff and the defendant presented and to 
decide whether plaintiff proved that the product was defective 
because it lacked adequate warnings. The jury would resolve the 
issue of defectiveness by consulting the proof adduced as to the 
risk and utility factors examined above and other considerations 
which might be applicable in ascertaining whether risk out-
weighed utility. Defendant's evidence regarding state of the art 
may be important to the jury's deliberations. However, state of 
the art would not be an affirmative defense but would only be 
relevant to the jury's efforts to strike the risk-utility balance in 
ascertaining whether the product was defective due to inade-
quate warnings. 
Several ideas support the treatment of state of the art which 
I propose immediately above. First, the approach suggested es-
sentially honors the jurisprudence of products liability law that 
the Montana Supreme Court has carefully developed over the 
last twenty-three years. Second, this resolution would allow for 
the implementation of products liability's underlying public poli-
cy rationales, particularly those relating to the compensation of 
consumers for injuries inflicted by defective products and to 
manufacturers' superior ability to absorb these costs. 
Third, the treatment recommended is fair, especially because 
it accommodates the interests of plaintiffs whom defective prod-
ucts have allegedly injured and manufacturers of these products. 
For example, the approach is a compromise between the "stricter 
liability" view, making state of the art inadmissible, which some 
courts and writers characterize as absolute liability,76 and the 
"lenient" perspective, making state of the art admissible and 
effectively a complete defense, which certain courts and commen-
tators describe as negligence. 77 
The resolution proposed is equitable, therefore, because it 
and subfactors (b)-(e) of the third factor in Rix, 222 Mont. at 318, 713 P.2d at 201-
02; see also supra text accompanying note 22. In other words, were there safer, 
equally effective alternatives to 2,4-D? 
76. See supra notes 43, 45-47 and accompanying text. 
77. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
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allows judges and juries to accord some weight to state of the art 
as one aspect of an overall balancing of numerous factors in the 
risk-utility calculus. The approach also permits manufacturers 
which typically have superior information, particularly regarding 
their own design and manufacturing processes, scientific and 
technological knowledge that was available at the time of manu-
facture and the relevant industry, to present this material, even 
as the solution enables plaintiffs to rebut this evidence or to 
show the availability of other alternatives involving design or 
warning or of additional scientific or technological information. 
Moreover, the treatment recommended strikes a fair balance 
between plaintiffs and defendants because it will allow some 
plaintiffs to recover even when manufacturers lack knowledge of 
pertinent risks by making state of the art relevant to, but not 
dispositive of, the risk-utility balancing test. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Montana Supreme Court has accepted the Montana 
Federal District Court's certification of the important issue of 
admissibility of state of the art in products liability cases which 
allege failure to warn. The Montana Supreme Court should re-
solve this question primarily by relying on its carefully-consid-
ered products liability jurisprudence developed since 1973. This 
approach should lead the court to treat state of the art as inad-
missible or as one aspect of the risk-utility balancing test of 
whether a product was defective because it lacks adequate warn-
ings. 
